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This essay interweaves two stories—one theoretical and empirical, the other
autobiographical. The first story embeds the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the broader
political economy of the Middle East and the global accumulation of “capital as power.”
The second story narrates the authors’ personal journey to uncover, theorize, and
research this enfoldment. The essay explores and contextualizes the misleading duality
of politics and economics; the link between military spending, finance, and stagflation;
the concepts of “dominant capital” and “differential accumulation” and their evolution
through “breadth” and “depth”; the manner in which these concepts and processes
inform the political economy of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the ways
in which they help identify the key role of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition and
predict the periodic eruption of Middle East “energy conflicts.” In their explorations, the
authors have encountered numerous gatekeepers who tried to derail their research as
well as a few open-minded editors who sought to promote it, and it is probably fair to
say that, dialectically, they have benefited from both.
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Middle East Energy Conflicts, Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition
1. The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition
During the late 1980s, we published a series of working papers offering a new ap-
proach to the political economy of Israel and wars in the Middle East.1 The re-
search journey leading to these papers started a decade earlier, with our attempt
to understand the local political-economic roots of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Our local focus, though, proved too narrow. Gradually, we realized that the con-
flict, however domestic in appearance, could not be understood in isolation from
the broader political economy of the Middle East, the role of the superpowers, par-
ticularly the United States, and the logic of capital accumulation more generally.
1. See Rowley, Bichler, and Nitzan (1988, 1989), Bichler, Nitzan, and Rowley (1989), Nitzan, Rowley,
and Bichler (1989), and Bichler, Rowley, and Nitzan (1989).
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In line with this broader vista, our approach in these working papers rested on
three new concepts. It started by identifying the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition
—an alliance of armament firms, oil companies and financial institutions based
mostly in the United States—whose interests, we posited, converged in the
Middle East.2 It continued by arguing that the interests of this coalition were
best measured by its differential accumulation—i.e., by its performance relative
to other large firms. And it concluded by showing that variations in differential
accumulation predicted subsequent Middle East energy conflicts.
At the time, the papers seemed unpublishable. They were politically unaligned
(neither neoclassical nor Marxist), and they were nondisciplinary (belonging to
neither economics nor politics nor to any other social science, for that matter).
But they made a scientific prediction: the Middle East, they argued, was ripe for
another round of military hostilities and oil crises (Bichler, Rowley, and Nitzan
1989, sec. 2.3), and when the 1990–1 Gulf War broke out, their theoretical framework
sounded very relevant.
Now, prediction alone does not guarantee publication, certainly in the main-
stream social sciences. But these were no ordinary times. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the global victory of neoliberalism,
the world of academic publishing began to change: talk of “capitalism” and
“accumulation” was no longer politically incorrect, journals of critical political
economy started sprouting everywhere, and enterprising editors, energized by
the rekindled spirit of competition, hunted for new and different takes on a
rapidly changing world.
One of these new journals was the Review of International Political Economy
(RIPE). The referees who vetted our piece were clearly schizophrenic, finding it
hard to decide whether it was innovative and path breaking or faulty and unsub-
stantiated. But the RIPE editors decided to gamble, publishing our 124-page
submission as-is in a two-part paper series (Nitzan and Bichler 1995; Bichler and
Nitzan 1996b). Moreover, despite the exceedingly long page count, they agreed
to include a data appendix with the articles’ raw financial time series.
2. The Unknown Facts
This last point merits elaboration. Good science depends on empirical evidence,
and empirical evidence means more than findings and conclusions: it also requires
authors to provide their raw data, discuss the data, and show that they indeed
measure what they claim to. In economics (and in the social sciences more gener-
ally) this requirement is rarely met. In practice, most economists do not engage in
2. Our original term was the “Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition,” but a journal referee later
opined that the term “armadollar” sounded too much like armadillo, so we reluctantly replaced
it with the duller yet safer “weapondollar.”
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empirical analysis at all. The few who do empirical work seldom provide their data.
And surprising as it may sound, many of the basic data they use—from “real GDP”
to “productivity” to the “capital stock”—bear little or no connection to their
declared conceptual underpinnings (Leontief 1982, 1983; Nitzan 1989; Bichler and
Nitzan 2009, ch. 5–8).
But our reason for engaging with the data went beyond mere formalities. When
the subject at hand is hamstrung by rigid disciplinary boundaries, exploring new
data can be highly generative: it exposes contradictions, casts doubt, and calls for
new categories, original ways of thinking, and novel theories.
To illustrate, take the study of oil. As it stands, the subject is crisscrossed with
disciplinary barriers and boundaries: energy policies, the machinations of politi-
cians, and the activities of state officials are normally dealt with by international-
relations pundits; the causes and consequences of oil production, prices, and trade
are monopolized by macroeconomists; individual companies and sectors are
handled by applied microeconomists and finance specialists; the interaction
between oil, religion, and ethnicity is dominated by experts of culture; and so
on. Every aspect of this subject seems tucked within its own protected niche, me-
diated by its own concepts and methods and dominated by its own gatekeeping
experts.
And the same holds true for the study of military spending and the arms
trade. Here, too, the boundaries are clear: the interaction between armament,
interstate conflict, and the balance of power belongs to international-relations
specialists; the effect of armaments on overall trade and the balance of payments,
employment, and growth rates is the domain of economists; and the impact of
armament on domestic bellicosity is the purview of political scientists and
culturalists.
These boundaries can be very stifling, serving to safeguard consensus, ward
off challenges, and prevent novelty—and it is precisely in such a context that
new data can prove subversive. As we shall see in the next section, our own
work uncovered a new, long-term correlation between the differential profitabil-
ity of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the periodic eruption of
Middle East energy conflicts. The data showed that, although every regional con-
flict has its own features, and although these features relate to various aspects of
society and therefore to different social sciences, we can go beyond these partic-
ularities. Specifically, we can identify a general process that encompasses, molds,
and gradually shapes these otherwise unique conflicts, and we can show that
this process belongs not to this or that narrow domain of society, but to the
universalizing power logic of capitalism at large.
By predicting the historical ebb and flow of Middle East energy conflicts, dif-
ferential profitability allows us to overstep the fractures separating international
relations, economics, domestic politics, and culture. And as these fractures
become less relevant, so do the categories they enforce and the theories they
impose.
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Take the foundational concept of “scarcity.” Economists use it to explain, ratio-
nalize, and justify the ways in which commodities are produced and priced. The
larger the gap between our unlimited wants (demand) and limited means
(supply), they argue, the greater the scarcity. The greater the scarcity, they contin-
ue, the higher the price on the one hand and the stronger the incentive to produce
on the other. And since oil is a commodity like any other, they conclude, it follows
that its production and pricing—just like the production and pricing of every
other commodity—is driven by scarcity mediated by supply and demand.
Our own work, however, shows that this foundational concept is dubious.
We have demonstrated not only that the very notion of scarcity is circular and
nonscientific, but also that, even if valid, its conventional measure bears no
systematic relation to the production and pricing of oil (Nitzan and Bichler
1995, 489, fig. 6; Bichler and Nitzan 2015, 52, fig. 1). In addition, we have showed
that OPEC governments—which mainstream economic theory loves to blame
for “intervening in,” “shocking,” and “distorting” the otherwise “free market”
for oil—share the same pecuniary interests as the very oil companies they suppos-
edly seek to undermine (Nitzan and Bichler 1995, 485, fig. 5; Bichler and Nitzan
2015, 58, fig. 2).
With so much going against it, it is no wonder that research like ours has
been rare. Very few researchers have ever bothered to examine the historical
profits, contracts, and sales of the leading oil and armament firms over the
past century, let alone relate them to the political economy of the Middle
East. And since nobody had investigated this subject, when we started our re-
search in the late 1980s, these long-term time series simply did not exist: they
had to be conceived, collated, analyzed, unified, and standardized, often from
scratch.
And that wasn’t easy. First, there were theoretical issues. For example, what con-
stitutes a “leading armament firm” or a “dominant oil company”? How should they
be ranked? How do we reconcile their various accounting methods, different re-
porting periods, and numerous retroactive revisions? What is the meaning of
“real” military spending and arms exports (as opposed to their nominal dollar
values)?
And then there were practical hurdles. Recall that these were the 1980s, before
the internet, the World Wide Web, and readily accessible databases. The “data
points” were scattered across different libraries around the world, buried in
various print publications. They had to be located and requested via snail mail.
When found, they were snail mailed back via interlibrary loans—sometimes in
print, at other times as photocopies or on microfiche. And when they arrived,
they had to be collated, organized, and inputted, one datum at a time, into user-
unfriendly computer programs (Microsoft Excel came into common use only
five years later).
Given these difficulties and the amount of work needed to overcome them, we
thought it was important to make our raw data freely available. We hoped that
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these data would enable other scientists to critically engage with and extend our
work, and we were therefore delighted that RIPE shared this vision of open
science and was willing to put in the extra pages.
3. Energy Conflicts and Differential Profit
The historical link between energy conflicts and differential profits is demonstrat-
ed in figure 1.3 The chart shows the differential return on equity of the Petro-Core.
This measure is computed in two steps: first, by subtracting the return on equity of
the group of Fortune 500 companies from the return on equity of the Petro-Core;
and second, by expressing the resulting difference as a percent of the Fortune 500’s
return on equity. Positive readings (grey bars) indicate differential accumulation:
they measure the extent to which the Petro-Core beats the Fortune 500 average.
Negative readings (black bars) show differential decumulation: they tell us by
how much the Petro-Core trails this average.4
A stretch of differential decumulation constitutes a “danger zone”—a period
during which an energy conflict is likely to erupt in the Middle East. The actual
breakout of a conflict is marked by an explosion sign. The individual conflicts
are listed in the note underneath the chart (for a similar analysis that uses different
data to show the same results, see Bichler and Nitzan 2015, 65–7).
Figure 1 shows three stylized patterns that have remained practically unchanged
for nearly half a century:
. First and most important, every energy conflict save one was preceded by the
Petro-Core trailing the average. In other words, for a Middle East energy conflict
to erupt, the leading oil companies first have to differentially decumulate.5 The
only exception to this rule is the 2011 burst of the Arab Spring and the subse-
quent blooming of “outsourced wars” (our term for the ongoing fighting in
Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, which is financed and supported by a multitude of
governments and organizations in and outside the region). This round
erupted without prior differential decumulation—although the Petro-Core
was very close to falling below the average. In 2010, its differential return on
equity dropped to a mere 3.3 percent, down from 71.5 percent in 2009 and a
whopping 1,114 percent in 2008.
3. Fig. 1 was first published in Nitzan and Bichler (1995, 499, fig. 10b) with data ending in 1991. It
was later updated in Bichler and Nitzan (2015, 64, fig. 4) with data through 2013. An earlier, non-
differential chart is given in Rowley, Bichler, and Nitzan (1989, 26, fig. 8).
4. The disproportionately high values for 2002 (+426 percent), 2007 (+892 percent), and 2008
(+1,114 percent) are due to the Fortune 500’s very low rates of return in those years.
5. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again during the 2000s, differential decumulation was
sometimes followed by a string of conflicts stretching over several years. In these instances, the
result was a longer time lag between the initial spell of differential decumulation and some of
the subsequent conflicts.
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. Second, until 2014 every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies
beating the average. In other words, until very recently, war and conflict in
the region—processes that are customarily blamed for rattling, distorting, and
undermining the aggregate economy—served the differential interests of the
Fig. 1. Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits: The Petro-Core vs. the Fortune 500
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential return on
equity is the difference between the return on equity of the Petro-Core and the
Fortune 500, expressed as a percent of the return on equity of the Fortune 500. For
1992–3, data for Fortune 500 companies were reported without SFAS 106 special
charges. The last data point is for 2016.
NOTE: The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP Amoco since 1998), Chevron
(with Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (before 1998), Royal
Dutch Shell and Texaco (before 2000). Company changes are due to mergers.
Energy conflicts mark the starting points of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
1980 Iran-Iraq War, the 1982 second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1990–1 first Gulf
War, the 2000 Second Palestinian Intifada, the 2001 attack of 9/11 with the launching
of the “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan, the 2002–3 second Gulf
War, the 2011 Arab Spring and outsourced wars, and the 2014 third Gulf War.
SOURCES: Reproduced and updated from Bichler and Nitzan (2015, 64, fig. 4); data from
Fortune, Compustat through WRDS, and Mergent.
Marxist Perspectives on Palestine/Israel 423
large oil companies at the expense of leading nonoil firms.6 This finding, al-
though striking, should not surprise us: differential oil profits are intimately cor-
related with the relative price of oil (Bichler and Nitzan 2015, 60, fig. 3); the
relative price of oil is in turn highly responsive to Middle East risk perceptions,
real or imaginary; these risk perceptions tend to jump in preparation for and
during armed conflict; and as the risks mount, they raise the relative price of
oil and therefore the differential accumulation of the oil companies. (This
long-term pattern, though, appears to have been broken with the onset of the
third Gulf War in 2014. Despite the ongoing hostilities, oil prices have plummet-
ed and differential decumulation has not only continued but reached record
lows. We return to this apparent structural change in the last section of the
essay.)
. Third and finally, with one exception, in 1996–7, the Petro-Core never managed
to beat the average without there first being an energy conflict in the region.7 In
other words, the differential performance of the oil companies depended not on
production but on the most extreme form of sabotage: war.8
As far as we know, this analysis remains unique: no one else has uncovered the
patterns it reveals, let alone analyzed its underlying relationships and broader
implications.
4. Politics and Economics
The questions leading to this analysis first emerged in the early 1980s when we
were still university students—though initially these questions pertained not to
the global political economy of the Middle East but to Israel. During those
years, the country was mired in a deep crisis that had started in the early 1970s
and intensified after the political rise of the radical Right in 1977. The crisis was
marked by two seemingly unrelated phenomena: stagflation and militarization.
The stagflationary process combined decelerating growth and rising unemploy-
ment on the one hand with soaring inflation and a booming stock market on the
other. In 1983, at the peak of this process, Israel’s one-year-old invasion of Lebanon
appeared headed for a humiliating defeat, the economy stagnated, and inflation hit
200 percent. The stock market, however, rigged by the large conglomerates, the
6. It is important to note here that the energy conflicts have led not to higher oil profits as such
but to higher differential oil profits. For example, in 1969–70, 1975, 1980–2, 1985, 1991, 2001–2, 2006–7,
2009, and 2012, the rate of return on equity of the Petro-Core actually fell; but in all cases the fall
was either slower than that of the Fortune 500 or too small to close the positive gap between them,
so despite the absolute decline, the Petro-Core continued to beat the average.
7. Although there was no official conflict in 1996–7, there was plenty of violence, including an
Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks (“Operation Desert Strike”).
8. For the details underlying the individual energy conflicts as well as a broader discussion of the
entire process, see Bichler and Nitzan (1996b, 2004), Nitzan and Bichler (2002, ch. 5; 2006b).
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finance ministry, and the central bank (yes, by all three, in daily collusion) reached
an all-time high.9
In this context, we found it striking to see Israeli academics insisting that politics
and economics must be studied separately and independently. On the “political”
side, the country was becoming increasingly militarized and racialized. Labor gov-
ernments have long maintained that Israel’s was an interstate conflict with its Arab
neighbors. However, Menachem Begin’s new right-wing government abandoned
this facade. By embarking on an open policy of Jewish settlements and permanent
military rule in the occupied Palestinian territories, by invading Lebanon with the
stated intention of “cleansing” it of “Palestinian terrorist organizations,” and by ce-
menting the bond between the Rabbinate church, Israeli nationalism, and Jewish
racism, this government exposed the true roots of the conflict: a foundational clash
between the Zionist project and the indigenous Palestinian population.
The “economy,” though, continued to function as if none of this mattered—or so
it seemed. For Israeli social scientists, the economic categories of supply, demand,
equilibrium, productivity, the capital stock, output, and prices—and therefore the
actual economy they defined—remained self-contained. Politics, militarization, re-
ligion, and racism of course counted but only as “external shocks” and “distor-
tions.” Moreover, these shocks and distortions were remnants of an old statist
legacy, and the good news was that, courtesy of the new “liberal” government,
they were finally on their way out.
The insistence on separating economics from politics produced strange bedfel-
lows—for example, free-market economists leading Peace Now demonstrations.
During the day these economists worked in the service of capital, advising govern-
ments, consulting corporations, and preaching the wonders of perfect competition
and the evils of government intervention. At night, though, they marched the
streets and gave speeches, calling on their government to end the occupation
and give the Palestinians their own state. And for most observers this marriage
looked natural. In their minds, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories
and its statist economy were offspring of the same original sin: Socialist
Zionism. Relieving Zionism of its socialism, they argued, would liberate both the
Palestinians and the market in one fell swoop.
This context helped keep the country’s social sciences, founded during the Cold
War, highly conservative. They dismissed Marxism as irrelevant to the Israeli case,
discouraged broad criticisms, and penalized innovative dissent. Most of their aca-
demics were mainstream, and even those who saw themselves as radical and so-
cialist rarely allowed their “political beliefs” to affect their “professional
research.” Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s—the dark years of the
Begin-Peres-Shamir regime—you could not find a single paper written by an
9. The rigging of the stock market was reluctantly and only partially investigated by the Bejsky
Commission (see Bejsky et al. 1986). See also Nitzan and Bichler (2002, 119).
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Israeli academic in a heterodox journal of political economy (let alone a paper that
used radical methods and theories).10
At the time, the only people who offered Marxist political-economic analyses of
Israel and its broader context were members of Matzpen, a radical left movement
of Hebrew and Arab activists founded in the 1960s. According to Orr and Mach-
over’s seminal book Peace, Peace, and No Peace (1961, 2009; the latter, English trans-
lation has a slightly different title), Israel’s evolution was rooted, first and foremost,
in its conflict with the Palestinians—a process that, they argued, began in the late
nineteenth century with the Zionists’ first organized colonization of the country,
abated after the Palestinian defeat of 1948, and reignited with the 1967 occupation
of additional Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza.11
An innovative Marxist exploration of this process was offered by another
Matzpen activist, Emmanuel Farjoun (1978, 1980, 1983). Farjoun identified a pro-
gressive “dual-economy” bifurcation of the Israeli labor market into both a monop-
oly sector of large firms with unionized employees and also a competitive sector of
small firms with unorganized workers. The 1967 occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza, he showed, hastened this bifurcation by flooding the competitive sector with
cheap Palestinian labor. And this hastening, his work suggested, made the Pales-
tinians highly dependent on Israel, weakened the position of organized Jewish
labor relative to capital, and eventually paved the way for the rise of Israel’s
radical Right.
5. Military Spending and Inflation
As noted, our own research focus was the twin processes of militarization and stag-
flation, and at the time this focus seemed congruent with “macro-Marxist” theories
that emerged in the United States in the 1960s during the Vietnam War and that
gained traction during the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. The most relevant of these
theories, we thought, was the monopoly capital thesis, which was broadly associ-
ated with the works of Kalecki (1971, 1972), Huberman (1961 [1936]), Tsuru (1956),
Steindl (1945, 1976 [1952], 1984 [1979]), Baran and Sweezy (1966), Magdoff (1969,
1972), Braverman (1998 [1974]), and Magdoff and Sweezy (1987 [1983]), among
others. The monopoly capital thesis posits that the monopoly stage of capitalism
is characterized by a growing divergence between falling costs and rising prices.
This divergence, the theory claims, generates on the one hand a tendency for
the surplus to rise while on the other hand it limits the system’s inherent ability
to offset or absorb this surplus. And these conflicting processes, it concludes,
serve to alter the nature of the state.
10. On the academic literature of the period, see Nitzan and Bichler (1996, 1997).
11. Although it relied solely on public sources, their book was banned by the Israeli censors.
426 Bichler and Nitzan
During the competitive capitalism of Marx’s time, argued the theory’s advocates,
growth was led by private investment, and since taxation was imposed mostly on
profit and therefore reduced the amount available for investment, the state was ex-
pected to stick to a laissez-faire policy of limited intervention and to a minimal tax
footprint. The monopoly phase of capital, though, shifted the emphasis. The
growth of large firms made capitalism hyperproductive, which meant that the
key challenge now was not how to produce more surplus (supply) but how to
realize it (demand). And this is where “state intervention” became crucial.
In principle, the state can expand the economy’s aggregate demand in a variety
of ways: it can spend on civilian items such as low-cost housing, education, R&D,
health, and infrastructure (welfare); it can increase its military budget (warfare); or
it can engage in some combination of the two. In practice, though, the state’s
options are more limited. Big business and the leading capitalists loathe facing gov-
ernment competition in civilian markets. They also dread losing their commanding
heights—and therefore the ideological supremacy of private investment—to
public management of the economy. And given these objections, the only way
left for a capitalist government to avoid stagnation is through what David Gold
(1977) called “military Keynesianism”: a bellicose form of demand management
led by a “Keynesian Coalition” of big business and large unions that shun peaceful
civilian spending in favor of armaments and an aggressive foreign policy.
Figure 2 contextualizes this new order of monopoly capitalism. The graph shows
the century-long relationship between U.S. economic growth and the country’s
military spending. The thin line plots the annual rate of economic growth
against the right-hand scale. The thick line shows the level of military spending,
expressed as a share of GDP, against the left-hand logarithmic scale. Both series
are smoothed as a ten-year trailing average to emphasize their long-term
tendencies.
The data show the close co-movement of the two series (a Pearson correlation
coefficient of + 0.58). After the First World War, disarmament went hand in
hand with falling growth, but this situation proved temporary. In the 1930s, the
tide inverted: military spending soared in preparation for the Second World
War, and the economy boomed. After the war, when demobilization coincided
with a sharp drop in growth, the U.S. National Security Council (1950) suggested
that, looking forward, the government should consider keeping military expendi-
tures permanently high as a way of avoiding another depression. The subsequent
adoption of military Keynesianism, along with the wars in Korea and Vietnam,
helped achieve that goal. During the 1960s–80s, military expenditures remained
over 10 percent of GDP and economic growth above 4 percent—lower than
during the Second World War but rapid enough to sustain the buoyancy of Amer-
ican capitalism and the confidence of its capitalists. By the early 1990s, though, the
Cold War had ended, and with neoliberal “peace dividends” undermining military
budgets, economic growth decelerated sharply: in the decade ending in 2016,
growth fell to a mere 1.3 percent, a level last seen in the 1930s.
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On the face of it, the logic behind this correlation was highly pertinent to 1980s
Israel, in whose economy rapid business concentration and soaring inflation
appeared to have been offset by rising military budgets, massive spending on
settlements, and the bloating of religious institutions and organizations. The
only thing left to do was to test this relationship empirically, but this testing
proved easier said than done.
6. Mapping Israel’s Dominant Capital
The main problem was that Israeli scholars—including those on the left—had
never bothered to map their country’s unfolding capitalist structures, class rela-
tions and power dynamics. The most neglected subject was the corporate core—
that is, the largest holding groups and their intricate relations with the state. In
our view, any investigation of a modern capitalist polity must begin with this
Fig. 2. U.S. Military Spending and Economic Growth
SOURCE: Reproduced and updated from Nitzan and Bichler (2006a, 6, fig. 1); original
data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Global Financial Data.
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core, yet in Israel of the early 1980s, nobody knew the basic historical facts about it.
Even the most rudimentary financial time series—the core’s total assets, net profits,
and sales and the owners’ equity—were unavailable.
In fact, even the raw data—the companies’ annual financial reports—could not
be found in any one location. The most obvious depositories—the Central Bureau
of Statistics, the Bank of Israel, the Ministry of Finance, and the Office of the Tax
Comptroller—possessed only disorganized fragments. The National Library,
which according to Israeli law must be given two copies of every print publication,
had no more than a limited sample. And when we checked with the companies
themselves, we learned that they too had only a few specimens—and we were
asking for their own financial reports! The net result was that the financial
history of these firms, and by extension their political-economic significance,
was largely unknown. For lay persons, these firms seemed everywhere; for the
pundits, they were nowhere.
And so we decided to fill the void. We labored for months, excavating, decipher-
ing, and organizing the obscure facts. And since these were themid 1980s, before the
internet and readily accessible computerized data, everything had to be done man-
ually. We had to go from office to office, from library to library, from archive to
archive.Wehad to collate, photocopy, andwhennecessary hand copy the individual
printed reports wherever we found them. We had to read the numerous footnotes
and extensive small print to reconcile endless inconsistencies and numerous revi-
sions (particularly those associated with hyperinflation “adjustments” and retroac-
tive “restatements”). Eventually, we managed to assemble a rudimentary, albeit
historically complete, statistical picture of what we subsequently called Israel’s dom-
inant capital (see Bichler 1986, 1991; Nitzan 1986; Rowley, Bichler, and Nitzan 1988).
And it was only then, when we started analyzing this entity, that we finally realized
why everyone was trying to keep it safely in the statistical shadows.
7. From Breadth to Depth: Accumulating through Crisis
Our analysis indicated that until the mid 1960s, the structure of the Israeli market
had been rather dispersed, at least by subsequent standards (Nitzan and Bichler
2002, ch. 3). This structure, formed during the British Mandate era, consisted of
three distinct sectors. The dividing lines were primarily “political”: the largest
and most important sector was the government; the second largest was the Hista-
drut (confederation of labor unions); and the third was private. Since greenfield in-
vestment was almost entirely financed by unilateral capital inflows, and since these
inflows were allocated almost exclusively by the government, the economy was
considered “statist.”
The leading corporations and economic organizations, often in collaboration
with politically connected families and foreign investors, acted as de-facto agents
of the state, abiding by its macro and micro priorities. In return, they were
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invited to invest in and trade with government-sanctioned projects, were awarded
state subsidies and exclusive licenses, enjoyed multiple protections against foreign
and domestic competition, and participated in looting the properties abandoned
by and confiscated from the Palestinian refugees of 1948.
In retrospect, we can say that the state during those years acted as a sheltering
“cocoon,” incubating the future business organizations and institutions that would
eventually become the core of Israel’s political economy. The 1966–7 recession
helped shed this cocoon. Following a massive wave of mergers and privatization,
the old “political” sectors disintegrated, replaced by dominant capital: a small
cluster of giant holding groups surrounded by big monopolies and large investors
that gradually took over the commanding heights of Israeli society and eventually
transformed it into a full-fledged capitalist mode of power. In 1996, we summarized
this transformation as follows:
Until 1972, economic growth in Israel was disproportionately affected by two
“external” stimuli: (1) the unilateral capital inflow of German compensation
between 1955 and 1965, and (2) the “Palestinians boom” in the immediate
years after the 1967 War. During the 1955–1965 period, unilateral transfers
from Germany accounted for most of the capital inflow, and were almost iden-
tical to the annual change in GNP. The end of these transfers in 1965 was fol-
lowed by the severe recession of 1966–1967. The situation changed again in
1968, when the Israeli market suddenly expanded to include one million
new consumers from the occupied territories.…
… From the early 1970s onward, the growth of the large conglomerates
came to depend increasingly on the differential depth [relative growth of
profit per employee] rather than breadth of accumulation [relative growth
of employment]. This was achieved in three principal ways. First, mergers
and acquisitions brought a larger share of the profit under the control of
these firms, enabling them to better control competition and prevent an
unruly rise in capacity. Second, with civilian production entering a period
of protracted stagnation, resources started shifting into financial activity
and inflation began to rise. The conglomerate’s financial assets where inflat-
ed relative to the economy’s total, and the share of labour eroded. Finally
and perhaps most importantly, the intensification of the Israeli-Arab conflict
contributed to rising military spending and growing arms exports. This bur-
dened the aggregate economy, but much like in the US, the ensuing “mil-
itary bias” was highly beneficial, both relatively and absolutely, to the
leading arms contractors of the big economy… This pattern of “military/fi-
nancial accumulation” was typical to all of the core firms. (Nitzan and
Bichler 1996, 74–5, 77)
As part of this transformation, the government—particularly after the 1977 rise of
the radical Right—altered its domestic and foreign stance. Domestically, it adopted
a laissez-faire rhetoric of deregulation and privatization, gradually withdrawing
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from its former role of directing and determining greenfield investment. In terms
of foreign policy, however, it pursued a proactive, bellicose line, menacing neigh-
boring countries and especially the Palestinians. This double movement helped
alter the focus of accumulation: instead of the rapid employment and GDP
growth that had marked the previous regime (“external breadth” in our terminol-
ogy), the emphasis shifted to income redistribution via rising military spending and
stagflation (“external depth”).
And so began the gilded age of Israel’s militarized capitalism (Nitzan and Bichler
2002, ch. 4). The gist of this period is illustrated in figure 3. The chart shows two sets
of series, both smoothed as five-year trailing averages. The left-hand log scale
denotes the rates of GDP growth and inflation while the right-hand log scale
Fig. 3. Israeli Stagflation and Differential Accumulation
NOTE: Series are shown asfive-year trailing averages. Inflation is the annual rate of growth
of the GDP deflator. Dominant capital includes Leumi, Hapoalim, IDB, Koor, and Clal.
SOURCE: Reproducedwith slight stylisticmodifications fromNitzan andBichler (2002, 124,
fig. 3.2); original data from corporate financial statements and Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics.
Marxist Perspectives on Palestine/Israel 431
indicates the differential profits of the top five holding groups (computed by the
share of their net earnings in total capital income).
As we can see, until the mid 1960s, when the Israeli market was still relatively
dispersed, growth was very high (∼10 percent) and inflation relatively low by sub-
sequent standards (∼8 percent). But by the late 1960s, the rise of dominant capital
had triggered a radical change. GDP growth plummeted, reaching less than 3
percent in the mid 1980s, while inflation, instead of falling as mainstream econom-
ics would have predicted, soared to over 200 percent. This stagflation was a boon
for dominant capital. As the figure shows, its differential earnings benefited mas-
sively and disproportionately relative to the rest of the business sector, soaring
eightfold to 5 percent in the mid 1980s, up from 0.6 percent in 1970. This
bonanza, though, ended in the late 1980s, when the global rise of neoliberalism in-
troduced a totally new regime of accumulation, forcing small-to-medium bellicose
countries such as Israel and South Africa to radically transform their mode of
power, open up to foreign takeovers and scale back their militarized structures
(Nitzan and Bichler 2001; Bichler and Nitzan 2007).
8. The Gatekeepers
Nowadays, these observations may seem less controversial. But when they were
first made in our master’s theses and doctoral dissertations, they elicited stiff aca-
demic opposition. Nitzan’s (1986) master’s thesis, submitted to the Department of
Economics at McGill University, was failed by its external referee. Titled
“Holding Groups and the Israeli Economy,” the thesis demonstrated the close con-
nection between rising inflation and the differential consolidation of Israel’s dom-
inant capital, among other relationships, and these claims were too much for its
Canadian Zionist reader to stomach. As an orthodox agricultural economist, con-
ditioned by the elegance of supply and demand, she could not fathom how a purely
macroeconomic process such as inflation could have any connection to a “social”
phenomenon like the redistribution of income, so she ceremonially failed the
thesis.12 It cost Nitzan two years of legal wrangling, grievances, appeals, and lost
reputation to have the referee’s report jettisoned and the thesis accepted and rein-
stated. The research itself was later published in Science & Society (Nitzan and
Bichler 2000).
Similarly with Bichler’s work. His Ph.D. dissertation, titled “The Political
Economy of Military Spending in Israel,” was submitted to the Department of Po-
litical Science at the Hebrew University (Bichler 1991). The thesis examined the
12. As a devout Zionist, she was also enraged by many of the unpleasant facts cited in the thesis.
For example, she did not like Nitzan’s reference to the 700,000 Palestinian refugees produced by
the 1948 war, a number she believed to be grossly exaggerated. She also disliked some of Nitzan’s
sources: for example, Israel’s most important investigative weekly, Ha’olam Hazhe, which in her
view was a yellow newspaper.
432 Bichler and Nitzan
connection between military spending and the rise of Israel’s dominant capital.
The research, based partly on Kalecki’s framework, bifurcated the business
sector into two segments—dominant capital and “the rest”—and showed, among
other things, that military expenditures operated to redistribute income in favor
of the former group while civilian spending worked in favor of the latter.
The dissertation committeemembers had never heard of Kalecki andwere there-
fore indifferent to his radicalmodel being applied to Israel. Theywereflabbergasted,
though, by Bichler’s unpatriotic econometrics. His empirics demonstrated that
Israel’s wars might have served and even depended on the profits of its large corpo-
rate groups, and this possibility was impossible for them to contemplate.
The dissertation was sent to an external referee with an explicit instruction to
fail it—only that here, unlike in Nitzan’s case, the referee refused to cooperate
and informed Bichler of the plot. The committee, though, was unfazed and ap-
proved the dissertation only after Bichler deleted the offensive econometric
chapter. Our attempts to publish this research in mainstream journals were repeat-
edly rejected on equally embarrassing pretexts. Eventually, it was published in the
Review of Radical Political Economics (Bichler and Nitzan 1996a).
9. The CasP Triangle: Capitalized Power, Dominant Capital, and
Differential Accumulation
As noted, our early research was heavily influenced by Marxism, particularly the
neo-Marxist version of monopoly-capital theory.13 Yet from the very beginning
we sensed that something in this framework was seriously lacking. Our initial
plan was simply to “follow the surplus.” We naively thought that, by tracing the
various realizations of this surplus—from military spending and the settlements
to religious institutions and financial intermediation—we would be able to
narrate the development of Israeli capitalism and model its gyrations. But as we
delved into the actual research, we realized that the basic categories (surplus,
capital accumulation, rate of profit, etc.) and the dualities in which they were em-
bedded (economics-politics, real-financial, productive-speculative, actual-fictitious)
were difficult if not impossible to concretize and measure. Seeking solutions, we
delved into Marxist debates on these subjects, but they discouraged us even
further.
The problem, we concluded, was that the neo-Marxist revisions of Marx’s value
theory did not go far enough. Instead of placing power at the center of analysis,
they treated it as an addendum, a separate sphere that merely complements the
13. Since the 1980s, “neo-Marxism” has been broadened to include various cultural theories asso-
ciated with writers such as Gramsci, Foucault, Leotard, and Jameson. In this essay, we use the
term much more narrowly to denote scientific attempts to revise and adapt Marx’s value analysis
to the new age of monopoly capitalism.
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key “economic” entities of capitalism. And that path, we thought, was leading to a
dead end (for a concise summary of these difficulties, see Bichler and Nitzan 2012).
To analyze contemporary capitalism, we argued, requires a fundamental re-
thinking of capital itself (for a full account, see Nitzan and Bichler 2009). First,
we posited that accumulation is neither a utilitarian process distorted by power
(the neoclassical version) nor a productive process assisted by power (the
Marxist view) but rather a power process quantified as capitalization.
Second, we argued that, with power at the center of analysis, the macro-Marxist
notion of “capital in general” becomes insufficient and potentially misleading.
Instead, we need to differentiate various forms of capital, and we need to do so
based on relative power. This requirement led us to the notion of dominant capital
—the idea that the capitalist mode of power is dominated by a core of leading corpo-
rate groups and state institutions—and that it is the inner and outer alliances and con-
flicts of this core that stir the historical development of capitalism as a whole.
And third, we claimed that the shift from utility and labor to power, on one
hand, and from general capital to dominant capital, on the other, called for a
new building block. The conventional view of capital is economic and therefore ab-
solute. Wedded to production and consumption, capital in this view is counted in
stand-alone units, be they neoclassical “utils” or Marxist “SNALT” (socially neces-
sary abstract labor time). But if we think of capital in terms of power, we must also
change our elementary particle: we need to think not of absolute accumulation but
of differential accumulation.
10. From Israel to the Middle East
As we came to realize, the significance of this CasP triangle—that is, capitalized
power, dominant capital, and differential accumulation—goes beyond Israel.
Many Middle East analysts, both mainstream and radical, continue to see the
region’s conflicts as imperial in nature, related first and foremost to securing
Western access to cheap oil. But as figure 1 in section 3 shows, using the CasP tri-
angle, the underlying logic of these conflicts can be explained very differently.
The chart analyzes the history of these conflicts not in relation to the level of oil
production or the rate of Western economic growth but to the differential profit of
the dominant oil companies. As noted earlier in the essay, over the past half
century the differential profit of these firms as well as the relative earnings of
oil-producing countries (OPEC and non-OPEC) have come to depend not on the
volume of oil being produced and sold but on its relative price,14 and this relative
price hinges not on the “scarcity” of oil, but on the mayhem and fear created by
Middle East energy conflicts.
14. At the global level, the price and volume of oil show little or no correlation (Bichler and Nitzan
2004, 305–6, n42).
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The predictive power of this framework has been remarkably robust, at least
until recently. To reiterate, according to figure 1, every energy conflict save one
was preceded by the leading oil companies trailing the average (differentially decu-
mulating); until 2014, every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies
beating the average (differentially accumulating); and with one exception (1996–
7), these companies never managed to beat the average in the absence of a prior
or concurrent energy conflict. Clearly, accumulation here represents and manifests
not productivity and utility but power and violence.
11. Still About Oil?
Is this framework still valid today? In our opinion, the answer is “only in part.” On
the one hand, the differential profits of the oil companies and the revenues of the
oil-producing countries remain tightly correlated with the relative price of oil: over
the past decade or so, both have plummeted in tandem. So this side of the theory
still works. On the other hand, as figure 1 demonstrates, since 2014 the synchro-
nized decline of oil prices and earnings has occurred despite ongoing regional con-
flict and plenty of violence. On this count, the theory seems inconsistent with
recent events.
Is this partial breakdown a sign of things to come? Will the differential profits of
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition continue to stir Blood and Oil in the Orient,
as Essad Bey (1932) poetically called it, or are we witnessing the end of an era?
In our view, the answer to this question will depend crucially on the conflict
within the global ruling class.15 The potential significance of such intraclass con-
flicts was illustrated during the 1960s by Michael Kalecki (1964, 1967). In his
essays “The Fascism of Our Times” and “Vietnam and U.S. Big Business,”
Kalecki forecasted that continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam would increase
the dichotomy between the “old,” largely civilian business groups located mainly
on the U.S. East Coast and the “new” militarized business groups, primarily the
arms contractors, of the West Coast. The rise in military budgets, he anticipated,
would force a redistribution of income from the old to the new groups. The
“angry elements” within the U.S. ruling class would then be significantly strength-
ened, pushing for a more aggressive foreign policy and further propagating what
Melman (1974) would later call the “permanent war economy.”
Is there a similar intraclass conflict affecting the ebb and flow of Middle East
wars? To contextualize this question, consider figure 4, which juxtaposes two
global coalitions: the Weapondollar-Petrodollar cluster, made up of listed integrat-
ed oil and defense corporations, and the Technodollar Coalition, comprising listed
technology firms, both hardware and software. Each series measures the market
15. For more on the issues discussed in this section, see Bichler and Nitzan (2004, 2015), Nitzan
and Bichler (2006b).
Marxist Perspectives on Palestine/Israel 435
capitalization of the relevant coalition, expressed as a percent share of the global
market capitalization of all listed firms.16
The figure shows a clear inverse relationship: since the mid 1970s, the global
market capitalization shares of the two coalitions have moved in opposite directions
(with only a brief exception in 1985–90). Now, since relative capitalization hinges
on differential profit expectations and risk assessments, and since these expecta-
tions and assessments reflect the broader trajectories of the global political
economy, we can hypothesize that there is an inherent conflict between these two
coalitions: conditions that favor one coalition undermine the other, and vice versa.
Fig. 4. Shares of Global Market Capitalization
NOTE: Series denote monthly data shown as 12-month moving averages. The last data
points are for February 2017.
SOURCE: Reproduced and updated from Nitzan and Bichler (2009, 373, fig. 17.3); original
data from Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD for world total, OILINWD for inte-
grated oil; AERSPWD for defense; TECNOWD for technology).
16. A similar chart, focusing only on the United States, is given in Nitzan and Bichler (2002, 272,
fig. 5.9).
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The significance of this structural conflict is best evaluated in historical retro-
spect. The classical imperialism of the early twentieth century was spearheaded
by the leading oil companies, whose activities dominated and often dictated the
foreign policies of the old powers. After the First World War, these companies
helped draft various regional agreements—from Sykes-Picot (1916), San Remo
(1920), and Cairo (1921) to Red Line (1928) and Achnacarry (1928)—carving and
shaping the Middle East in line with their own interests. During that period,
their main concern was the “free flow” of oil—that is, political stability, open
access to oil at low prices, and minimal royalties to the region’s rulers.
This free-flow era ended in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The demise of colo-
nialism undermined the oil companies’ former autonomy. Instead of calling the
shots, they now had to negotiate and align with oil-producing oligarchies, elements
in their own parent governments and armed forces, and other corporate coalitions,
particularly in armament and finance. The center of this complex network, we
have argued in our work, was the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. Unlike
during the free-flow era, their interest now lay in limiting the flow of oil. The
main purpose was to raise the price of oil so as to boost oil incomes and
augment military spending and arms exports into the region. And that goal was
best served by a divide-and-rule strategy that kept the Middle East embroiled in
a never-ending string of managed energy conflicts that stoked the Cold War and
the arms race and pushed the world into reoccurring stagflation crises.
In the 1990s, the capitalist mode of power was again transformed. First, the end
of the Cold War accentuated the gradual decline of the United States and the
former Soviet Union relative to the former periphery, particularly in Asia.
Second, the ongoing global wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions gave rise
to a new and highly complex power hierarchy of giant transnational corporations
whose activities, although deeply embedded in state structures, gradually work to
undermine the very notion of “state sovereignty.” And third, the pivotal political-
economic role of oil has been challenged by the threats of peak oil and climate
change, the development of renewable alternatives, and most importantly, the
emergence of new power hierarchies built not on raw materials, but information
—hence, the Technodollar Coalition.
The rise of this new, information-based power is illustrated in figure 4. Between
1990 and 2000, the global market capitalization of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar
Coalition continued its long-term slide, hitting a record low of 4 percent of the
total in 2000, down from 14 percent in 1980. By contrast, the market capitalization
of the Technodollar Coalition more than quadrupled—rising to 21 percent of the
total in 2000, up from a mere 5 percent in 1990.
In the early 2000s, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition embarked on a last-
ditch attempt to resurrect its capitalized power, pushing the U.S. White House
toward yet another Gulf War. And for a decade or so, the effort succeeded: by
2010, the Technodollar Coalition’s market capitalization dropped to a mere 7
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percent of the total—the experts called it a “burst bubble”—while the Weapondol-
lar-Petrodollar Coalition’s share doubled to 8 percent.
This comeback, though, was partial and short-lived. In 2010, with the Middle
East still in flames and the analysts predicting the imminent arrival of peak oil,
the price of oil—along with oil profits—started to plummet. And as the plunge con-
tinued, the market capitalization of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition again
fell below 5 percent of the total, while that of the Technodollar Coalition resumed
its uptrend. Evidently, the current conflicts in the region are not “intense” enough
to create a crisis atmosphere, and with oil prices low, the petroleum and armament
firms, along with OPEC, remain stuck in the doldrums.
The new Trump Administration, populated by key oil, armament, and finance
representatives and seemingly hostile to the high-technology sector, may try to
revive the fading fortunes of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition once again.
But over the longer haul, this fight might prove difficult to win. Unlike in the
1970s and 1980s, the U.S. government can no longer easily instigate, let alone
manage, Middle East energy conflicts, particularly against opposition from the as-
cending Technodollar Coalition. And if this prognosis turns out to be correct, the
Middle East might witness yet another significant transformation.
The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, the oppression of Arab pop-
ulations by military and religious theocracies, and the global spread of Saudi Wah-
habism and terrorism have not happened in a vacuum. Over the past half century,
these activities aligned with and were in turn supported by the Weapondollar-Pet-
rodollar Coalition. And if the power of this coalition continues to slide, that slide
might spell the demise of Israel’s occupation of Palestine and a major shakeup of
many of the region’s oligarchies.
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